European Energy Union? Caught between securitisation and ‘riskification’ by Judge, Andrew & Maltby, Tomas
 
 
 
 
Judge, A. and Maltby, T. (2017) European Energy Union? Caught between 
securitisation and ‘riskification’. European Journal of International 
Security, 2(2), pp. 179-202. (doi:10.1017/eis.2017.3) 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/133004/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 19 December 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
1 
	
European Energy Union? Caught between Securitisation 
and ‘Riskification’ 
Abstract: Fears about the security of supplies have been central to debates 
about the development of an integrated EU energy policy over the past 
decade, leading to claims that energy has been 'securitised'. Previous 
analyses have found, however, that although shared security concerns are 
frequently used as a justification for further integration, then can also serve 
as a rationale for Member States to resist sharing sovereignty. Transcending 
this apparent paradox would require not just agreement about whether 
energy supplies are security concerns, but also agreement about what kind 
of security concern they are. In this article, we examine whether such an 
agreement could emerge through a comparative analysis of constructions of 
gas security in the UK and Poland. Utilising a framework that draws from 
both the philosophical and sociological wings of Securitisation Studies, we 
demonstrate that although gas has been elevated on the security agendas of 
both states, the specific logic of insecurity – securitisation or riskification – 
underpinning these constructions differs substantially, and is conditioned by 
distinct modes of governance in each Member State. This, we contend, 
limits the potential for further integration of EU energy policies in the 
context of the European Commission's proposals for an 'Energy Union'. 
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Introduction  
For over a decade, the European Commission1 has regularly warned that the 
security of EU energy supplies, particularly gas, is at risk. The intensity and 
resonance of these concerns has steadily increased, following temporary 
disruptions to gas imports, the enlargement of the EU to include Member 
States highly dependent on external supplies, and the deterioration of 
political relations between the EU and its main supplier Russia. Such 
warnings have frequently acted as impetuses for the Commission to propose 
further integration of national energy policies, often as a means of sharing 
risks and increasing the security of supplies. This has generated a vibrant 
debate about the prospects for the further integration of EU energy policy, in 
the face of continuing and developing threats to energy security.2  
While many observers have characterised these developments as the 
‘securitisation’ of EU energy policy,3 there have been relatively few 
																																								 																				
1 Hereafter referred to as the Commission.  
2 For example, Vicki L. Birchfield, and John S. Duffield (eds.) Toward a Common 
European Union Energy Policy: Problems, Progress and Prospects (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011); Kacper Szulecki, Severin Fischer, Anne T. Gullberg, and Oliver Sartor, 
‘Shaping the ‘Energy Union’: between national positions and governance innovation in EU 
energy and climate policy’, Climate Policy 16:5 (2016), pp. 548-567. 
3 Sandra Lavenex, ‘EU external governance in ‘wider Europe’’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 11:4 (2004), pp. 692-3; Jelena Radoman, ‘Securitization of Energy as a Prelude to 
Energy Security Dilemma’, Western Balkans Security Observer 4 (2007), pp. 36-44; 
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attempts to specifically examine these developments through the lens of 
securitisation theory.4 The few attempts to do so have reached different 
conclusions about whether securitisation has been successful or not,5 and in 
doing so have highlighted an apparent paradox at the heart of EU energy 
policy. While shared security concerns are frequently used as a justification 
for further integration,6 they can also serve as a rationale for Member States 
to resist any transfer or sharing of competences.7 As a result, the 
relationship between securitisation and integration remains ambiguous and 
poorly understood. 
We argue that the key to understanding this relationship is to examine 
securitisation not just in terms of whether there is intersubjective agreement 
about whether energy is a security concern, but also whether there is 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
Richard Youngs, Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge (London: 
Routledge 2009), p. 41; Eamonn Butler, ‘The Geopolitics of Merger and Acquisition in the 
Central European Energy Market’, Geopolitics 16:3 (2011), pp. 626-654. 
4 A core claim of securitisation theory, which we follow in this article, is that ‘security’ has 
no fixed or objective meaning. Instead it is socially constructed.  
5 Michal Natorski and Anna Herranz-Surrallés, ‘Securitizing Moves to Nowhere? The 
Framing of the European Union Energy Policy’, Journal of Contemporary Research 4:2 
(2008), pp. 71-89; Francis McGowan, ‘Putting Energy Insecurity into Historical Context: 
European Responses to the Energy Crises of the 1970s and 2000s’, Geopolitics 16:3 
(2011a), pp. 486-511. 
6 Emil Kirchner and Can Berk anticipate greater cooperation, integration and a common EU 
energy policy, driven by such energy security concerns. ‘European Energy Security Co-
operation: Between Amity and Enmity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 48:4 (2010), 
pp. 859–880.  
7 Pami Aalto and Dicle Korkmaz Temel are sceptical about the potential for substantial 
integration because of “a lack of shared beliefs and patterns of calculation”. It is these 
beliefs that we interrogate. ‘European Energy Security: Natural Gas and the Integration 
Process’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52:4 (2014): 758–774; 771. Tomas Maltby 
also highlights how security concerns are contested within member states, leading to 
inconsistent preferences on energy policy integration. ‘Between Amity, Enmity and 
Europeanisation: EU Energy Security Policy and the Example of Bulgaria's Russian Energy 
Dependence’, Europe-Asia Studies, 67:5 (2015), pp. 809-830. 
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agreement about what kind of security concern they are. This requires taking 
a step back from the EU level and examining whether similar kinds of 
security concerns are present at the national level, which we do through a 
comparative analysis of attempts to securitise gas supplies in the UK and 
Poland. Rather than confining ourselves to a Copenhagen School 
understanding of securitisation, which adopts a narrow focus on the 
construction of discourses of existential threat, we adopt a wider approach 
that draws from both the philosophical and sociological wings of 
Securitisation Studies. From the philosophical wing, we utilise Corry’s 
distinction between securitisation and riskification8 as a means of examining 
the different ways that gas has been constructed as a security issue in each 
Member State. From the sociological wing, we highlight the key role played 
by contextual features – namely established modes of market and state-led 
energy governance, and the role of gas in national energy systems – in 
enabling and constraining securitisation/riskification. 
The central research problem we are addressing is why EU energy policy 
integration has been limited, despite claims by the Commission that a lack 
of integration poses a security threat. In our case studies we demonstrate 
that the UK and Polish governments have different conceptions of the 
insecurity of gas supplies within their respective countries: the former 
																																								 																				
8	Olaf Corry, ‘Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-order Security and the Politics of 
Climate Change’, Millennium: Journal of International Relations 40:2 (2012), pp. 235-258.	
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conforming to a logic of riskification, and the latter conforming to a logic of 
securitisation. We argue that the presence of these different logics raises 
questions about whether the Commission can reconcile them into a common 
intersubjective understanding of threats as a means of legitimising the 
further integration of EU energy policy.  
The article develops in four parts. The first outlines our theoretical 
framework, which focuses on multiple logics of insecurity and the role of 
contextual factors. Section two briefly traces the Commission’s discourse of 
insecurity and its promotion of a predominantly liberal market approach to 
securing gas supplies in order to contextualise our comparative analysis. 
Sections three and four outline the empirical analysis of our case studies on 
the UK and Poland respectively. We conclude with reflections on the utility 
of the concepts of securitisation and riskification and the considerable 
barriers to premising further energy policy integration on security concerns. 
Securitising energy? 
The core argument of securitisation studies is that instead of examining 
whether or not real and objective threats exist, analysts should focus on the 
process through which such security issues are socially constructed. This 
enables an examination of how such issues emerge and dissolve, and what 
impact they have on politics and policymaking. The Copenhagen School’s 
original securitisation framework focuses on an examination of political 
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discourse for evidence of security speech acts, and their acceptance or 
rejection by a relevant audience.9 Within this framework, such speech acts 
take the form of an existential threat to the survival of a valued referent 
object. Successful securitisation is evident in the reproduction of these 
claims within wider political discourse and the development of a political 
environment in which extraordinary measures can be adopted which “break 
the normal political rules of the game”.10 
The Copenhagen School framework has been the subject of extensive 
critiques that have called into question almost every element of the theory.11 
Many of these shortcomings become especially apparent when the theory is 
applied to different empirical cases, which highlight the often diverse ways 
in which (in)security is constructed in practice. This is especially the case 
when the framework has been used to examine energy politics in the EU,12 
the USA,13 and East Asia,14 where the limitations of the Copenhagen School 
have been all too apparent. Two limitations are particularly relevant.  
																																								 																				
9 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 25. 
10 Ibid. p.24. 
11 For a recent summary see Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka, 
‘‘Securitization’ revisited: Theory and cases’, International Relations [Early Online] 
(2015). 
12 Natorski and Herranz-Surrallés (2008); McGowan (2011a). 
13 Jonna Nyman, ‘Red Storm Ahead: Securitisation of energy in US-China relations’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43:1 (2014), pp. 43-65. 
14 Andrew Phillips, ‘A dangerous synergy: energy securitization, great power rivalry and 
strategic stability in the Asian century’, The Pacific Review 26:1 (2013), pp. 17-38.  
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The first is that the Copenhagen School focuses on a single essentialist logic 
of security based on existential threats to survival to the exclusion of other 
possible logics or meanings of insecurity. This is problematic because, as 
recent debates on the concept of energy security have highlighted, there are 
many possible ‘meanings’ of security based partly on the interests of 
different actors involved in energy trade and governance, and multiple 
dimensions or types of energy (in)security.15 To speak of energy security as 
if it were a single coherent discourse is highly questionable as such claims 
can take various forms across different contexts.16 Because of the plurality 
of possible security meanings, energy issues are a ‘difficult case’ to examine 
using the original Copenhagen School framework. Nonetheless, this does 
not mean that discourses of energy security have no effect on the form or 
content of energy policy. Instead it means that analysts should be attuned to 
the possibility that energy may be constructed as a security issue in different 
ways, in different contexts, and with different political consequences.17  
																																								 																				
15 Bert Kruyt, Detlef P. van Vuuren, Han J. M. de Vries and Heleen Groenenberg, 
‘Indicators for energy security’, Energy Policy 37:6 (2009), pp. 2166-2181; Benjamin K 
Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, ‘Conceptualizing and measuring energy security: A 
synthesized approach’, Energy, 36:8 (2011), pp. 5343-5355. 
16 Lynne Chester, ‘Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic 
nature’, Energy Policy 38:2 (2010), pp. 887–895; Christian Winzer, ‘Conceptualizing 
energy security’, Energy Policy 46 (2012), pp. 36-48. 
17 Christopher S. Browning and Matt MacDonald, ‘The Future of Critical Security Studies: 
Ethics and the Politics of Security’, European Journal of International Relations 19:2 
(2013), pp. 235–255; Gavin Bridges, ‘Energy (in)security: world-making in an age of 
scarcity’, The Geographical Journal 181:4 (2015), pp. 328-339. 
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Ciută makes precisely this point in his critical analysis of different concepts 
of energy security in which he identifies both a logic of war, which closely 
aligns with the Copenhagen School focus on existential threats to survival, 
and a logic of subsistence.18 He argues that the latter is not defined by, “the 
imperative to survive”, but instead, “by the functional demands of various 
sectors of activity, which means its absence does not lead to extinction, but 
to dysfunction”.19 These logics involve quite different types of security 
claims that are part of a more general distinction between security and risk. 
While there are also arguably different conceptions of risk, a broad 
distinction can be drawn between security threats that are immediate and 
urgent, and risks that are longer-term, based on uncertain and more diffuse 
dangers.20  
In a constructive ‘philosophical’ critique of the Copenhagen School,21 Corry 
separates these logics into distinctive processes of securitisation and 
riskification, in which the former is based on direct causes of harm that 
																																								 																				
18 Felix Ciută also identifies a third logic of ‘total’ or ‘banal’ security in which energy 
security potentially means the security of ‘everything’, ‘everywhere’ and ‘against 
everything’ which is an important debate that is beyond the scope of this article. 
‘Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?’, Security Dialogue 41:2 
(2010), pp. 123-144 (p.135). 
19 Ibid., p. 132. 
20 Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of 
Unease’, Alternatives: Global, Local Political 27 (supplement) (2002) pp. 63-92; Rens Van 
Munster, Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
21 For an explanation of the philosophical-sociological distinction which has come to typify 
securitisation studies, see Thierry Balzacq, ‘A theory of securitisation: origins, core 
assumptions, and variants’, in Thierry Balzacq (ed) Securitization Theory: How Security 
Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 2010a), pp. 18-28. 
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threaten the survival of a referent object, while the latter is based on indirect 
causes of harm that put the governability and resilience of a referent object 
at risk. While both processes begin with security speech acts, they take 
different forms. They are based on alternative constructions of the kind of 
threat, the values to be protected, and the nature of the response to these 
threats. Instead of leading to measures aimed at eliminating or severely 
curtailing an existential threat, Corry argues that riskification tends to lead 
to “programmes for permanent changes aimed at reducing vulnerability and 
boosting governance-capacity of the valued referent object itself”.22  
Such a philosophical distinction between logics of securitisation and 
riskification would appear to be particularly well suited for examining 
energy security because, as even a cursory glance at the literature on energy 
security reveals, many of the claims about security are about risks rather 
than threats.23 However, adopting a sharp distinction between logics of 
securitisation and riskification is not without its problems. It runs into some 
of the same issues with essentialism found in a classic Copenhagen School 
framework by positing ‘risk’ as a unified and rule-bound logic which 
neglects questions of how risks, like security threats, are constructed within 
																																								 																				
22 Corry (2012), p. 248. 
23 See also Edward Stoddard, ‘A Common Vision of Energy Risk? Energy Securitisation 
and Company Perceptions of Risk in the EU’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 
8:3 (2012), pp. 340-366.  
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particular cultures over time24 and are themselves subjected to contestation 
and adaptation in concrete empirical circumstances. It also brackets the 
question of whether a logic of riskification can be ‘intensified’ into a logic 
of securitisation or vice versa.25 Nonetheless, it has clear methodological 
advantages, as a set of ideal types for identifying different claims about 
security and their implications for political practice in particular situations.26 
When comparing the construction of security across cases rather than 
engaging in a more contextualised examination of a single case, such a 
simplification is both desirable and necessary. 
The second limitation of the Copenhagen School framework is its 
excessively textual understanding of (in)security, that neglects the important 
role that contextual factors can play in shaping the form, dynamics and 
outcomes of securitisation processes.27 As various researchers on the so-
called ‘sociological’ wing of securitisation studies have argued, processes of 
securitisation and riskification do not occur in a vacuum, but instead within 
the context of established power relations and institutional structures, which 
																																								 																				
24 Karen Lund Petersen, ‘Risk analysis-A field within security studies?’ European Journal 
of International Relations 18:4 (2012), pp. 693-717. 
25 Michael C. Williams, ‘The continuing evolution of securitization theory’, in Thierry 
Balzacq (ed) Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve 
(London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 216-218; Rens van Munster, ‘Logics of Security: The 
Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror’, Syddansk Universitet 
Political Science Publications 10/2005. 
26 Franziskus von Lucke, Zehra Welmann and Thomas Diez, ‘What’s at Stake in 
Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach’, Geopolitics 19:4 
(2014), pp. 857-884. 
27 Balzacq (2010a); Matt McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, 
European Journal of International Relations 14:4 (2008), pp. 563-587. 
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can enable or constrain the form and process of construction, as well as 
policy responses.28 These factors define the pre-established ‘normal’ politics 
of an issue, shaping the specific way in which attempts to reconstruct those 
issues in terms of security or risk will play out. Such a critique is 
particularly relevant for energy issues, where it is possible to identify two 
sets of contextual factors that affect the treatment of energy as a ‘normal’, 
‘risk’ or ‘security’ issue – technical and political-economic factors 
At the technical level, energy systems of any polity are complex; an 
assemblage of a particular mix of fuels in overall consumption and 
electricity production, the sources of these supplies (imported/domestic), 
established roles for particular types of energy in particular economic 
sectors, and a configuration of physical infrastructure including the capacity 
to import, produce and transmit. Major changes to any aspect of this 
assemblage will generally be very difficult, time-consuming and expensive, 
often requiring the construction of new generation and/or transit 
																																								 																				
28 Balzacq, (2010a), pp. 11-15; Thierry Balzacq ‘Enquiries into methods: a new framework 
for securitization analysis’, in Thierry Balzacq (ed) Securitization Theory: How Security 
Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 2010b), pp. 36-37. Context in this 
sense is external to the process of securitisation, in contrast to the thick contextualist 
approach set out by Felix Ciută which focuses on contextualised meanings of security, 
‘Security and the problem of context: a hermeneutical critique of securitisation theory’, 
Review of International Studies 35:2 (2009), pp. 301-326. 
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infrastructure.29 As a result, these technical factors are liable to produce 
strong path-dependent effects that shape and constrain future actions.30 
At the political-economic level, energy is produced, traded and used under 
certain conditions that are regulated by state actors engaged in different 
levels and forms of market intervention. These conditions constitute the 
“rules of the game” that structure the interactions of different actors.31 
Various typologies within Energy Studies draw distinctions between 
different forms of energy governance in particular states or regions such as, 
‘liberalism’ and ‘geopolitics’, ‘economic liberalism’ and ‘resource 
nationalism’,32 ‘liberal’ and ‘state’ capitalism,33 or ‘markets and institutions’ 
and ‘regions and empires’.34 Subtly different emphases aside, in all cases the 
																																								 																				
29 Ivan Scarse and Gordon MacKerron, ‘Lock-in’, in Ivan Scarse and Gordon MacKerron 
(eds.) Energy for the Future: A New Agenda (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
30 Major changes are not impossible: the energy systems of the UK and Poland have 
undergone important changes in recent decades, and several advanced economies are 
currently attempting a transition to lower-carbon energy systems, most notably Germany. 
The core point is that such changes are difficult, expensive and time-consuming. For more 
on energy transitions see Vaclav Smil, Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, 
Prospects (Santa Barbara, CA: Prager, 2010). 
31 Caroline Kuzemko, Michael F. Keating and Andreas Goldthau, The Global Energy 
Challenge: Environment, Development and Security (London: Palgrave, 2016), p. 58. See 
also Andrei V. Belyi and Kim Talus (eds.) States and Markets in Hydrocarbon Sectors 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
32 Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston, ‘The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism’, 
Survival 51:2 (2009), pp. 149-158; Francis McGowan (2008) ‘Can the European Union’s 
Market Liberalism Ensure Energy Security in a Time of ‘Economic Nationalism’?’, Journal 
of Contemporary European Research, 4:2 (2008), pp. 90-106. 
33 Wojciech Ostrowski, ‘State Capitalism and the Politics of Resources’, in Andrei V. Belyi 
and Kim Talus (eds.) States and Markets in Hydrocarbon Sectors (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), pp. 83-102.  
34 Aad F. Correljé and Coby van der Linde, ‘Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A 
European Perspective’, Energy Policy 34:5 (2006), pp. 532-543. Many have pointed to the 
role that states have come to play in national and global energy governance. See Navorz K. 
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main distinction that most researchers draw is between market-led and state-
led systems of energy governance.35  
Market-led governance is based on a deregulated market-based system of 
energy production, trade and consumption. Under this approach, market 
participants are the primary actors, which are expected to ensure supply 
reliability with minimal involvement or oversight from government actors. 
These actors are granted considerable autonomy, and in most cases are 
wholly or predominantly private entities.36 State-led governance, by 
contrast, is based on the subservience of markets to the political objectives 
of the state. Governments are the primary actors, not only involved in 
regulating market conditions, but also exercising substantial influence and 
control over the actions of market participants.  
Although technical and political-economic factors are both likely to play a 
role in any attempt at constructing energy as a security issue, their relative 
importance in enabling and constraining securitisation or riskification will 
differ. We expect that although technical factors can act as constraints on 
possible material changes to energy systems, particularly in the short-term, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
Dubash and Ann Florini, ‘Mapping Global Energy Governance’, Global Policy 2:s1 (2011), 
pp. 6-18. 
35 To be clear, these modes of energy governance are ideal types. They nonetheless 
represent two extremes on the full spectrum of political-economic conditions in the various 
EU Member States, even if certain systems may be marked by characteristics of both a 
market-led and state-led system.  
36 Governments may maintain part ownership of particular market participants under this 
system, but will usually not be the majority shareholder and will not direct the actions of 
the company in question. 
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they will primarily function as resources for actors’ claims about the (lack 
of) security within a polity. ‘High dependence’ or ‘high consumption’ do 
not automatically mean that energy will be securitised or riskified – this will 
depend on whether actors discursively construct these factors as ‘existential 
threats’ or ‘risks’. The task of the analyst should therefore be to identify 
whether an intersubjective understanding of these technical factors emerges 
among actors involved in energy governance, or whether different 
understandings emerge between different groups. 
Political-economic factors on the other hand could be much more decisive 
in whether energy issues can be securitised or riskified. As noted above, 
such factors structure the actions and interactions of the actors involved in 
energy governance. As such, they define what constitutes ‘normal’ energy 
politics in a particular spatial and temporal context. Across the EU Member 
States for instance, there are a range of modes of energy governance ranging 
from market-led to state-led. This does not mean that these structures are 
deterministic or cannot change; indeed constructing energy as a security 
issue is one such way in which the normal ‘rules of the game’ can be 
changed. However what securitisation and riskification mean cannot be 
separated from the particular political-economic circumstances in which 
they emerge. In particular, we expect that market-led and state-led energy 
governance will be amenable to the logics of securitisation and riskification 
to differing degrees.  
15 
	
While securitisation is possible in market-led systems, it would require 
fundamental changes that would undermine the basis of a liberal market. It 
would involve major levels of Government intervention and the central 
coordination of market participants’ activities, subordinating the market to 
the achievement of political objectives. In short, it is the antithesis of a 
liberal approach and would involve a radical shift from a market-led to a 
state-led system of energy governance. In a state-led system, securitisation 
is more likely because the state already tends to direct the energy system in 
the pursuit of other goals, and the adoption of exceptional measures to 
eliminate an existential threat does not undermine the economic foundations 
of the system of governance.37 While riskification could occur under either 
political-economic system in principle, we expect it to be more likely under 
market-led systems. Although major Government interventions would 
undermine such systems, selective interventions focused on improving 
resilience may be permissible as a means of preserving the autonomy of 
market participants and the functioning of a liberal market. By steering 
energy companies to take Government identified risks into account in their 
normal market activities, this can allow market failures to be addressed 
through primarily market-based means. This kind of riskified governance 
																																								 																				
37 The Copenhagen School themselves make fundamentally the same point: “Whereas 
economic nationalists have no problem invoking economic security in state terms, liberals 
are (or should be) constrained from doing so by their commitment to efficiency and thus to 
openness and competition. In principle, this commitment should exclude from 
securitization a great range of things that might count as serious economic or political 
issues” (Buzan, et al. 1998, p. 105). 
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would certainly involve greater levels of government influence, but without 
completely subordinating the market to the political objectives of the state.  
Research Design and Methods 
Taken together, these twin critiques of the Copenhagen School point to the 
need for taking different logics of security and how these may be shaped by 
contextual conditions seriously. In this article we respond to this need 
through an analysis of constructions of gas as a security issue in two EU 
Member States – the UK and Poland. This analysis is based around two 
research questions. First, has gas been constructed as a security issue and, if 
so, what form do those constructions take? Second, have technical and 
economic factors played a role in shaping these attempts to construct gas as 
a security issue?  
To address these questions, we focus on the time period in which concerns 
about energy security became prominent in the EU, 2006 to 2015. While it 
is common to focus on shorter ‘moments’ of exceptional discursive claims 
in securitisation analyses, we start from the premise that the construction of 
a security issue can also be an iterative, gradual process.38 This allows us to 
examine whether particular discourses and the policies that are enabled by 
them have become institutionalised and widely accepted or not. 
																																								 																				
38 Matt MacDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 14:4 (2008), pp. 563-587. 
17 
	
While the analysis of all EU Member States would allow us to fully gauge 
the level of intersubjective agreement about the kind of security concern gas 
is, this is not possible in the space of a single article. Instead, we begin by 
providing a brief overview of the major discursive and governance changes 
at the EU level in order to contextualise developments in the Member 
States. We then proceed to analyse two Member States case studies that we 
have chosen as exemplars of the very different systems of energy 
governance which currently exist among the Member States, and whose 
Governments have repeatedly and frequently expressed concerns about 
energy security over at least the past decade.  
In both cases, we focus on gas for two reasons. Gas has been the main focus 
of most claims about energy (in)security across Europe. Excluding other 
energy sources from our analysis also allows a narrower focus on the two 
contextual conditions identified above which, we argue, have the greatest 
role to play in shaping security constructions. At the technical level, we 
assess the relative share of gas in the energy and electricity production 
mixes of these Member States, and levels of dependence on particular routes 
or sources of gas supplies. At the economic level, we assess the respective 
roles of government and market actors in implementing governing gas 
supplies and responding to shifting security evaluations. 
The analysis of each Member State involves tracing how energy has been 
presented as a security issue in official discourse, how durable these 
18 
	
constructions have been over time, and what the relative influence of 
contextual factors is in each case. In each empirical section, we analyse 
changes in discourse and modes of energy governance separately, which 
allows us to analytically distinguish their effects and to account for their 
interaction. Across these two sections, we utilise a wide range of primary 
data in the form of publically available government and EU policy 
documents and statistics, speeches by prominent actors, reports by 
government agencies, and secondary literature by country and issue area 
experts.39 For the purposes of tracing discursive change, we focus on elite 
sources because the energy sector is relatively closed and technocratic in 
comparison to other sectors, which means that the authority to ‘speak 
security’ is largely confined to government elites and market participants, 
rather than requiring the explicit agreement of wider audiences.  
Constructing an Energy Union  
From its original guidelines on a European energy policy to the Energy 
Union proposal, the Commission has long sought to base a common energy 
policy on the twin objectives of ensuring, “security of supply at prices 
																																								 																				
39 Polish documents are official government translations into English. All national security 
strategies, energy policies and relevant regulator documents from 2000-2016 were 
analysed, the Factiva database was used to trace the discourse of key energy actors during 
this time period.  
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which are relatively stable and as low as possible”.40 These objectives have 
been supplemented since the 2000s by a third objective of sustainability and 
climate change policy.41 Prior to 2006, the Commission had already begun 
to speak of energy in terms of risks to the security of supplies. In 2000 it 
released a green paper on the security of energy supplies in which it framed 
growing dependence as a “structural weakness”,42 which made the EU 
vulnerable to any supply disruptions.43 Such tentative moves into security 
discourse were not about urgent and existential threats, but about potential 
supply risks.44 
Two major gas supply disruptions, in 2006 and 2009, acted as catalysts for 
the Commission to repeatedly portray supplies as insecure. Following the 
initial disruption, the language of risk featured increasingly prominently, 
with the Commission warning in its 2007 white paper that the “risk of 
supply failure is growing”.45 In 2008 the Commission argued that: 
“A number of Member States are overwhelmingly dependent on 
one single supplier [for gas]. Political incidents in supplier or 
																																								 																				
40 Commission, ‘First guidelines for a Community energy policy’, COM(68)1050, 18 
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41 Tomas Maltby, ‘European Union energy policy integration: A case of European 
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(2013), pp. 435-444. 
42 Commission, ‘Green Paper. Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply’, COM(2000)769, 29 November 2000, p. 2; p. 46. 
43 ibid. pp. 75-77. 
44 Commission, ‘The internal market in energy: Coordinated measures on the security of 
energy supply’, COM(2002)488, 11 September 2002, p. 51. 
45 Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, COM(2007)1, 10 January 2007, p. 4.  
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transit countries, accidents or natural disasters, the impacts of 
climate change, remind the EU of the vulnerability of its 
immediate energy supply.”46 
Such attempts to securitise, or more accurately riskify gas, can only be 
understood in the context of the different modes of energy governance in the 
EU’s Member States, and the Commission’s attempts to reshape these in a 
more liberalised and integrated direction. Traditionally, Member States have 
pursued energy policies in relative isolation from each other and in most 
cases have had to rely on nationally negotiated deals to import gas from 
non-EU countries due to a lack of domestic gas production.47 The reliability 
and availability of supplies was generally achieved through stable long-term 
contracts, joint ownership and financing of long-distance transit pipelines, 
prices determined by oil-indexation rather than market dynamics, and 
national restrictions on the final destination of the commodity. Under this 
arrangement both consumers’ security of supply and producers’ security of 
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demand was ensured through stable and predictable contracts, creating a 
mutual interdependence.48  
The Commission has consistently promoted the idea of an alternative: A 
single internal gas market premised on the development of a liberalised and 
competitive market for gas in which short-term trades are possible, prices 
are primarily based on the dynamics of supply and demand, and movement 
of supplies across the EU is unrestricted. While this undermines the 
traditional model of security, the objective is increased security of supply 
through greater diversification, increased interdependence between Member 
States, and a reduction in the potential for supply disruptions to cause 
interruptions to customer supplies.49 In short, the Commission’s efforts to 
develop an internal gas market have been an attempt to construct a sector in 
which the role of the state is to set limited regulatory conditions and only 
intervene in cases of market failure; a distinctly liberal approach to the 
security of supplies premised on integrationist principles.  
In 2006 the basic building blocks of such an approach were already in place, 
following the passage of the first and second packages of internal market 
legislation.50 The ‘Third Package’ adopted in 2009 involved more market 
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regulation; to ensure the separation of gas transmission from other activities 
to prevent cross-subsidy and anti-competitive practices among previously 
integrated companies.51 Other gas legislation has, in most cases, been 
significantly based on a liberal market approach, including the prioritisation 
of efforts to liberalise energy markets through the Third Energy package. 
For instance, the adoption of legislation for the prevention and management 
of supply disruptions in 201052 was explicitly premised on a hierarchy of 
intervention in which market participants would be allowed to respond in 
the first instance, with recourse to national governments or coordinated EU 
level action only in extreme circumstances. The Commission has been more 
actively involved in funding gas infrastructure, particularly reverse flows on 
existing pipelines to enable the mitigation of supply disruptions, though this 
has involved relatively minor investments.53 The Commission has extended 
its role regarding intergovernmental agreements for the supply of gas; as 
part of its Energy Union proposals it has sought a greater, ex ante and 
participatory role.54 This is a rare exception to a strictly liberal approach, 
along with the EU-Russia Early Warning mechanism for gas supply 
disruptions.  
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As Goldthau and Sitter argue, the Commission can be described as a 
“mostly” liberal actor.55 However, this does not mean that EU energy policy 
as a whole can be described as market-led. On the contrary, progress 
towards achieving gas market objectives has been slow, with liberalisation 
developing at different paces and to different levels in each Member State.56 
Both historically and in the present day, different Member States continue to 
conform more closely to either the state-led or market-led modes of energy 
governance. 
In summary, the Commission has long been a riskifying actor, framing gas 
supplies as threatened by growing dependence and associated risks, most 
notably of supply disruptions which affect multiple Member States and the 
EU as a whole. It has consistently promoted a predominantly liberal 
approach to ensuring and improving the security of gas supplies, advocating 
an approach in which the state has a limited role except in ensuring market 
functioning.  
United Kingdom 
Prior to the Commission’s initial attempts to develop a liberalised and 
integrated gas market, the UK’s approach to energy governance had already 
																																								 																				
55 Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter ‘A liberal actor in a realist world? The Commission 
and the external dimension of the single market for energy’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 21:10 (2014), pp. 1452-1472. 
56 European Court of Auditors (2015); Samuel R. Schubert, Johannes Pollak and Maren 
Kreutler, Energy Policy of the European Union (London: Palgrave, 2016), pp. 157-65. 
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undergone a period of radical transformation in the 1980s and 1990s 
towards less state intervention.57 Key aspects of this transformation were a 
systematic withdrawal of the state from gas and wider energy policy, the 
privatisation of state energy companies, the dissolution of the Department of 
Energy in 1992, the transfer of residual policy functions to the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the establishment of independent regulators 
for electricity and gas. Privatised companies and other market participants 
filled the gap left by the withdrawal of the state, taking on the responsibility 
of ensuring the availability and reliability of supplies. Although this process 
was one component of a broader trend towards deregulation and 
privatisation across the UK economy under successive Conservative and 
Labour governments,58 it was enabled by the UK’s lack of reliance on 
external sources of gas due to considerable domestic energy reserves and 
production.  
The UK gas sector did, however, go through two important transitions at the 
technical level in the years prior to the period examined in this study. First, 
gas production peaked in 2000, leading to the UK becoming a net importer 
of gas in 2004. This largely coincided with the UK also becoming a net 
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importer of oil and energy as a whole, which amounted to a major structural 
transformation in the UK energy system. Second, in preparation for this 
transition, the UK gas market ended its market isolation in 1998, following 
the construction of a pipeline to Belgium. This was eventually followed by 
further pipeline and LNG terminal developments in the early 2000s.59 
Discourses of gas insecurity 
Prior to 2006, gas and other energy supplies were both depoliticised and 
desecuritised in the UK. Even when it became apparent that the UK was set 
to become a net importer, the security of gas supplies was not called into 
question. Most notably, when the Government issued its white paper on 
Energy in 2003, the first in more than a decade, the importance of 
‘maintaining reliability’ was emphasised, rather than any need to respond to 
emergent risks or threats.60 Any risks to the security of supplies were 
described as ‘manageable’61 and the prospect of greater import dependence 
was framed in terms of an unproblematic ‘interdependence’ with external 
suppliers.62 Such confidence in the security of supplies was also evident in 
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various other government evaluations from the time.63 It was underscored 
by the belief that, “markets are likely to deliver energy reliability most cost-
effectively”,64 and that the role of the state should be to monitor these 
markets for any potentially threatening developments, while promoting 
liberalisation and ‘good governance’ abroad. In contrast, climate change as 
a consequence of continuing to use fossil fuels was explicitly considered a 
major threat, to be addressed through a transition to low carbon energy 
sources.65 
Although UK supplies were not affected by the January 2006 disruption a 
discourse of gas supply insecurity nonetheless began to emerge at this time. 
At the broadest level, the security of energy supplies was elevated to parity 
with climate change as one of the two main objectives of UK energy policy, 
and as a source of potential threats and risks.66 Gas supplies were singled 
out as a major source of potential risks,67 associated primarily with a need to 
ensure adequate levels of investment in new infrastructure to replace 
declining domestic gas production with sufficient pipeline and liquefied gas 
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capacity for importing supplies.68 The degree of discursive change should 
not, however, be overstated. Statements about the security of supplies 
invariably took the form of highlighting potential rather than urgent risks or 
threats. The 2007 white paper on energy states that “imports are not in 
themselves a threat to security of supply [but] bring new associated risks”.69 
The potential for supply disruptions affecting the UK was considered 
unlikely before the mid-2010s. The real ‘risk’ was a lack of competitive 
markets on the main gas supply routes to the UK rather than rising import 
dependence specifically.70  
This discourse persisted following the 2009 gas supply disruption, although 
disagreements began to emerge about how to evaluate potential threats. In 
the first white paper produced by the newly established Department for 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) the same discourse of potential risks 
present before the disruption was largely reproduced. It was emphasised 
that, “the immediate risks to UK security of supply were extremely low”, 
and that, “[t]he UK’s diverse sources of gas imports meant that we 
experienced little direct effect”.71 In contrast, the 2009 ‘Wicks Report’ 
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framed rising import dependence as an issue of “geopolitical security”72 and 
issued stark warnings about “significant negative economic impacts” that 
could arise from gas supply disruptions.73 While it was argued in the white 
paper that security should continue to be left to the market, the Wicks 
Report insisted that it was crucial that the UK, “retains independence in its 
foreign policy through avoiding dependence on particular nations”.74 The 
Conservative Party was highly critical of the Labour Government’s energy 
policy in the lead up to the 2010 election, highlighting growing import 
dependence and declining electricity capacity margins as ‘major threats’ to 
energy security.75  
However, the lack of explicit references to these threats once the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition took power and after the formation 
of the majority Conservative government in 2015, suggests that this was 
merely electioneering rather than a substantive shift. Indeed, since 2010 the 
discourse has taken a similar form to the pre-2009 period. Repeated 
reassurances about the security of gas supplies were combined with 
statements about potential threats and risks that could emerge in the future. 
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Each Annual Energy Statement and Security of Supply report presented to 
Parliament offered reassurances that the UK has, “the most liquid and one of 
the largest gas markets in Europe with extensive import infrastructure and a 
diverse range of gas supply sources”.76 Meanwhile the risks that these 
documents refer to are all potential rather than immediate. For instance:  
“The outlook for security of gas supply is broadly benign in the near 
term. This does not mean that it is risk-free; there are risks, both in 
the short-term and towards the second half of the decade when some 
uncertainties remain”.77  
Far from increasing the intensity of threat constructions, Government 
discourse since 2010 has gradually adopted a less securitised tone. The 
government stated in its 2013 Annual Energy Statement that the, “security 
of gas supply is expected to be robust in the short, medium and long term”78 
while the following year it reassured Parliament that the UK gas system 
was, “capable of responding flexibly to changing market conditions…[as] 
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has been well demonstrated in recent years in a range of challenging 
circumstances”.79 Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 
government reported the results of stress tests, which concluded that even in 
the event of a “full cessation of Russian gas supplies into Europe for an 
entire winter”, UK gas supplies would not be disrupted.80  
Kuzemko has argued that following a prior depoliticisation of energy policy 
there has, since the late-2000s, been a qualified re-politicisation of energy 
policy in the UK. It is argued that this is “partly through the impact of 
[emerging] narratives of national energy supply (in-)security”, so speech 
acts and the discursive construction of security contributing in turn to 
greater, though still limited, energy policy steering by the government.81 
Although a discourse of insecurity has emerged in the UK, we argue that it 
most clearly follows a logic of riskification rather than securitisation. Such a 
discourse has been relatively consistent throughout the entire 2006-2015 
period, with the government continually evaluating and reporting on risks to 
gas supplies in contrast to the period prior to this. Moreover, aside from 
some alarmist statements in 2008-2010, these evaluations of the level of 
‘risk’ have generally been favourable but not benign. Indeed, gas supplies 
are now frequently portrayed as a means of increasing the security of UK 
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energy supplies more generally, as a reliable low-carbon backup for 
renewables and as a major part of the energy mix, rather than as a threat to 
‘energy security’.82 This indicates that both that riskification has occurred 
and that there are few signs of any transition to a more securitised discourse 
in the near future. 
Energy governance 
Discursive changes within the UK must be understood in relation to the 
structural change from a net exporter to a net importer of gas. Almost all 
energy policy documents make reference to this fact. Nonetheless, it would 
be inaccurate to view the emergence of a discourse of gas supply insecurity 
as a simple result of such changes at the technical level. The initial 
discursive changes began several years after this transition was well known, 
in the late 1990s. Moreover, throughout the period examined above, gas 
supply discourse did not contain claims about imminent or urgent threats 
despite dependence on imported gas expanding from zero in 2003 to 45% 
by 2014 and gas continuing to occupy a prominent role in the UK energy 
mix. This lack of congruence between increased dependence and discursive 
change rules out a simple causal relationship. Where the transition had an 
effect is in providing the economic rationale for investment decisions taken 
by the private sector to construct pipelines for importing alternative supplies 
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to the UK market in anticipation of the decline of North Sea production.83 
This enabled the UK to retain gas as a major component of its energy mix, 
established connections to other EU markets for the first time and opened 
the UK to international LNG markets. The security of UK gas supplies was 
then no longer shaped solely by domestic developments and the reliability 
of what was its only external supplier, Norway, but also by developments in 
continental Europe and beyond. 
On the other hand, the fact that gas was such an important part of the UK’s 
energy mix prior to the transition, including in the generation of electricity, 
meant that there were strong economic incentives to source new supplies 
and significant economic barriers to investing in alternative energy sources 
and network infrastructures. Gas has retained a major role in the energy mix 
as a result, even as overall UK energy consumption declined from 2005 
onwards. The share of gas in UK energy consumption expanded slightly 
between 2005 and 2010, from 37% to 40%, before dropping to 28% in 
2014, its lowest level since the 1990s. In 2014, gas still accounted for nearly 
a third of the electricity generated in the UK.84  
More important than changes at the technical level have been the presence 
and preservation of a market-led approach to energy governance. 
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Throughout this period, decisions continued to be taken by private 
companies, highlighting that in terms of energy governance the UK gas 
market remains one of the most liberalised and least concentrated in the EU, 
with eight companies active in the supply or import of gas. Successive UK 
Governments have routinely called for the further liberalisation of European 
gas markets and the development of open market and ‘good governance’ 
principles in states supplying energy to international markets.85 
Governments also resisted the temptation to directly intervene in the market 
by, for instance, developing strategic (rather than commercial) gas storage, 
arguing that this would be unduly expensive and could interfere with 
incentives for private companies to invest in such infrastructure as needed.86 
In 2015, the Energy Secretary stated that “We know competition works. It 
keeps costs low and can deliver a clean and reliable energy system”.87 The 
objective was “allowing markets to flourish”.88  
While the market-led approach has not been displaced, faith in its ability to 
deliver security has increasingly been called into question. Some 
institutional and policy developments in recent years suggest that the UK 
has heeded Wicks’ dire warning that, “[t]he time for market innocence is 
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over”.89 The most visible development was the creation in 2008 of a 
dedicated energy department, DECC, the first such ministry in 26 years.90 
At its launch the Energy Minister Ed Miliband argued that the government 
would pursue a “strategic government and dynamic markets” approach in a 
departure from the “markets-only” approach of the past.91 What this meant 
in practice was that the government would become more active in setting 
energy policy objectives and playing a greater role in correcting market 
failures without habitually intervening in the functioning of the markets. In 
the gas sector specifically, the most visible interventions focused on 
enabling and incentivising shale gas exploration within the UK. The 
coalition government established an Office of Unconventional Oil and Gas 
within DECC in 2013 to support exploration,92 then moved this 
department’s functions to a separate Oil and Gas Authority. The Treasury 
supported this through reducing the tax paid by onshore gas projects 
(HMRC, 2013), while the Prime Minister actively lobbied the European 
Commission (with the Polish government) to ensure that exploration and 
drilling were not restricted by new regulations at the EU level (Cameron, 
2013).  
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Whether such interventions represent a ‘paradigm shift’ in UK energy 
policy is an ongoing subject of debate within Energy Studies,93 however it 
appears that, at least in the gas sector, none of these developments 
represents a decisive step away from market-led energy governance. Rather, 
they indicate a more active Government policy in support of an otherwise 
resilient market-led approach through selective interventions. Although the 
coalition government became increasingly ‘interventionist’ regarding the 
development of shale gas, it was also explicit that it considered there to be 
“no clear case for a further intervention in the gas market above and beyond 
the range of measures we are already taking to enhance our gas security”.94 
There is no evidence that this has changed under the majority Conservative 
government.95 Moreover, the transition from a net exporter to a net importer 
of gas has not resulted in a substantial reduction in the role of gas in the UK 
energy mix or the emergence of a highly securitised discourse about gas 
supplies. Instead gas has come to be viewed primarily as a means of 
ensuring wider energy security rather than as a direct source of threats. 
Extraordinary measures were not taken and instead government objectives 
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have been focused on developing the resilience of the UK energy system 
within a largely liberal market approach.  
Poland 
Prior to the late 1980s, Poland was a planned economy and the energy 
sector was no exception.96 There were high levels of state involvement, 
subsidised energy prices, low levels of energy efficiency and little 
consideration of the environmental impact of energy use.97 Enlargement 
pressure involved adhering to EU energy market liberalisation, and the 1997 
Energy Law Act98 paved the way for the transition towards a liberalised and 
unbundled energy market and the removal of state subsidies. In December 
1999 the Ministries of Treasury, Economy and Finance set out energy 
market liberalisation objectives,99 followed by the passage of the 2000 
Energy Policy which echoed these.100  
EU accession had a strong effect on Polish energy policy, but not an 
unconstrained one. As will be demonstrated, post-accession conditionality 
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has been somewhat weaker in that transposition and implementation of EU 
legislation has at times been slow and frequently delayed. The state has 
retained ownership of unbundled firms, resisted the development of 
independent energy regulation,101 and delayed price deregulation for 
households because of concerns about price volatility.102  
Discourses of gas insecurity 
Prior to the 2006 gas supply disruption there was a distinct lack of 
securitisation in the gas sector. The 2000 Energy Security Strategy 
concluded that the “energy safety of the state [...] has not been threatened 
during the past few years”.103 The 2003 National Security Strategy only 
included energy security as an objective of energy policy rather than being 
subject to explicit threats,104 while the Foreign Ministers’ annual addresses 
from this time made no reference to threats or risks to energy nor national 
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security.105 The 2005 address concluded that “the horizon is fortunately 
clear of any threats to our security”.106  
Although energy security was not a salient issue during this period, this did 
not mean that the government was completely unconcerned. For instance, 
Russia was framed as one of a group of “dubious suppliers”, and 
“unfavourable prices” were considered a problem.107 Such concerns became 
amplified following the January 2006 supply disruption when Poland 
experienced a one third decrease in gas imports from Russia, when energy 
became clearly securitised within the country, often taking the form of 
‘existential threats’ to national security. President Lech Kaczynski for 
instance alluded to Russian revanchism, stating: “I do not want to create the 
impression that Poland or Europe is under [military] threat, it is not [but] 
there are different forms of expansion. And one of them is energy”.108 The 
Polish Foreign Minister argued that “We cannot remain defenceless nor 
isolated amid this increasingly threatening situation”.109  
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Immediately after the 2006 supply disruption, the Polish Foreign Minister 
proposed a European Energy Security Treaty in a letter to all EU and NATO 
member states: 
“EU member states [need a] ‘firmly stated guarantee clause based on 
the ‘musketeer principle’; ‘[an] expression of solidarity of its parties 
linking them in the face of an energy threat…[and] political 
decisions of suppliers.”110 
The 2007 Polish National Security Strategy was similarly forthright, stating 
that: “[t]he dependence of Polish economy on supplies of energy resources – 
crude oil and natural gas – from one source is the greatest external threat to 
our security”.111 The Ministry of Economy stated that the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline which was being constructed between Russia to Germany 
(bypassing Belarus and Poland) was “a serious threat to Polish national 
security”.112 Similar securitising moves were evident throughout 2007 and 
2008, with successive Foreign Ministers frequently portraying energy 
dependence as a ‘weapon’ that was a ‘threat’ to national security.113  
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Such statements all indicate that energy was regarded as existentially 
threatened between 2006 and 2008, and even after a change in government 
and a ‘reset’ in relations with Russia, similar statements continued. Foreign 
policy statements constantly implied that a threat to energy security was a 
threat to national security and that insecurity was linked to increasing 
dependency and the perceived use of energy as a geopolitical tool by Russia. 
The Polish government prioritised energy security concerns in its foreign 
policy and in relations with the EU, most notably in its frequently expressed 
opposition to the Nord Stream pipeline, which often referenced “grand 
historical narratives of national identity and security”.114  
The effect of the 2009 Russia-Ukraine dispute was even more serious for 
Poland, which lost 45% of its supplies, leaving it reliant on increased 
imports from Norway and its domestic gas storage.115 In reaction, the Polish 
Foreign Minister made a series of statements emphasising the continued risk 
to national security.116 In 2010, for instance. he argued that “Poland and 
Europe [are] not only affected by classical threats, but also by a diverse 
array [of] challenges such as energy crises”.117 Overall, Poland pursued an 
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energy policy with the key objective of enhancing supply security through 
diversification (natural gas, shale gas, coal, and also nuclear), and this 
element of energy security has been securitised and considered an 
‘immediate threat’ to national security. Liberalisation of energy policy was 
accepted to an extent, whilst maintaining a large degree of government 
control in energy policy, and government intervention in regulated prices 
(for gas) which delayed transposition of the EU’s Second and Third Energy 
Packages.  
Remarking on the Ukraine crisis in March 2014, the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister equated traditional security threats with energy security.118 
The Visegrad Group, including Poland, sent a letter in March 2014 to 
the US Congress, stating that ‘Gas-to-gas competition in our region is a vital 
aspect of national security’.119 Later in the year a statement on Polish 
Foreign Policy Goals included reference to disruptions in energy supplies as 
a “threat” (amongst others) facing Poland.120 Again, with the Visegrad 
Group, Poland sent a letter to the Commission stating that the construction 
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of the Nord Stream 2 may threaten the cohesion of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.121  
In contrast to the riskification of gas supplies in the UK, discourses of gas 
insecurity have more closely conformed to a classic Copenhagen School 
logic of securitisation. Government claims about threats to energy being a 
national security issue have been consistent since January 2006, despite 
changes in government, and have focused overwhelmingly on the perceived 
vulnerability of gas supplies from Russia. This securitisation has 
underpinned both the government's desire for common EU action on energy 
security, and their hesitance to liberalise the Polish gas market in line with 
the European Commission's proposals. 
Energy governance 
As the country prepared for accession to the EU in 2004 the government 
sought to transpose EU market liberalisation and renewable energy 
production requirements into domestic law. The sector also had to deal with 
a transition away from domestic coal use, increasing energy demand, 
increasing energy imports particularly from Russia, and dramatic increases 
in the cost of energy to consumers and industry in the 1990s as a result of 
decreasing subsidies and increases in energy prices in the 2000s. Security 
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was largely subordinate to the task of transposing the main rules on internal 
energy markets. Liberalisation was limited as the state retained majority 
ownership of transmission system operators and energy companies for both 
electricity and gas.122 
Whilst the electricity market was formally liberalised in July 2007,123 there 
were delays in transposing the Second and Third Energy Package Directives 
with gas lagging behind.124 Poland was primarily concerned with how 
transitioning from a state-led to a market-led mode of governance may 
allow Russia (or ‘third countries’) to gain greater control of the Polish 
energy market.125 During the negotiation of the Third Energy Package, 
Poland successfully supported an option allowing the potential restriction of 
transmission system ownership by third-country companies on the grounds 
of security of supply (the ‘Gazprom clause’),126 though this was weakened 
after pressure from Germany.127 
This had a direct effect on Poland’s approach to energy security in its 
relations with the rest of the EU. Firstly, it prioritised external energy 
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security during its Presidency in late 2011.128 Secondly, Poland continued to 
lag in transposition of EU rules on energy market liberalisation.129 The 
Russian threat was important in this process, although Nowak argues that 
this was underpinned by opposition from the trade unions and large 
incumbent energy companies,130 with policy actions defending the 
monopolistic status quo.131 
Thirdly, Poland was a key supporter of the successful September 2011 
Commission proposal for an information exchange mechanism with regard 
to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third 
countries,132 in part to ‘banish the spectre of energy-related blackmail’.133 
This permitted the Commission to vet all intergovernmental agreements, 
and support member states at their request.134 Fourthly, Poland successfully 
lobbied with the UK for guidelines rather than new legislation regarding 
shale gas exploration.135  
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In response to gas supply disruptions the 2009 Energy Strategy stated that 
“state intervention in the energy sector will be used exclusively to ensure 
security”.136 In 2014 the government reiterated the role of state intervention 
in providing energy and national security: 
“The security of the state requires…the state’s influence on its 
implementation by energy companies, which will make it possible to 
respond in a fast and effective manner in the case of occurrence of 
threats in energy markets. It is necessary for the state to control the 
key infrastructure of the fuel and energy sector and to expand the 
supervision and control of the wealth of geological resources of the 
state.”137 
The proposal for a European Energy Security Treaty,138 invoking the 
necessity of legally binding solidarity, failed. However, the Lisbon Treaty 
included an Energy Article with a commitment for Member States to act a 
‘spirit of solidarity’ (Article 194). In 2014 the Polish Prime Minister 
successfully proposed the concept of a European Energy Union,139 though 
its focus on security of supplies was diluted and it has evolved into a 
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concept that attempts to harmonise policies on climate and energy policy, 
with the Polish proposal for a collective gas purchasing among member 
states accepted only as a possibility to be explored, and even then as 
voluntary, “during a crisis and where Member States are dependent on a 
single supplier”.140   
An important technical level factor in the understanding of energy security 
and role of the state in energy policy is the substantial shift in the geography 
of overall energy supply and demand, away from energy independence. 
Coal and lignite (brown coal) fuelled electricity generation, from domestic 
coal, accounted for 76% of primary energy consumption in 1990.141 By 
2013 this figure was 50%.142 Domestic production is set to decrease by 
2030, with production already halving since 1990.143 Despite privatisation, 
the majority of mines and major companies remain state owned and the 
industry directly employs 100,000 and is concentrated in a particular region 
– Upper Silesia.144 Donald Tusk referred to coal as “the strategic 
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foundation” of Poland’s energy security.145 The country has become more 
dependent on the import of energy, and the Polish government has been 
resistant to efforts to create more ambitious environmental energy policy, 
and to liberalise the policy area.  
In 1995 Poland was a net energy exporter,146 though since there has been 
growing dependence on energy imports.147 By the time of the first gas 
supply disruption in 2006 Poland was dependent on overall energy imports 
for 20% of energy consumption. This figure had increased to 32% by the 
second disruption in 2009 (before dropping to 29% in 2014).148 Russia 
supplied, through a long term contract, 75% of Polish gas in 2015.149 The 
decline in coal production means these gas imports constitute a growing part 
of the country’s energy mix and significantly, the share of gas in the Polish 
energy mix has increased, from 4% in 2004150 to 16% in 2014151 and gas 
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demand is forecast to increase by over 50% by 2030, compared with the 
2009 level.152 
In the gas sector specifically, high levels of state intervention have long 
been apparent, with the state-owned, vertically integrated company PGNiG 
responsible for 89% of gas sales in 2014.153 In 2014 there was only one 
transmission system operator (TSO) − OGP Gaz-System S.A. − a company 
wholly owned by the State Treasury and supervised by the Minister of 
Economy until late 2015.154 This is explained by the strong desire to retain 
the state’s role in guaranteeing gas supplies.155 The Polish regulator, URE, 
continued to set the maximum price whilst state-run distributor PGNiG sells 
gas to businesses and households; in response the EU Court of Justice ruled 
in September 2015 that Poland’s regulated prices for all business consumers 
breached EU Internal Gas Market rules.156 In 2015, a dedicated Energy 
Ministry was established, concentrating the governance of energy policy 
previously divided between five separate ministries, and bringing state-run 
companies under the Ministry’s control. The state retains a strong role in the 
Polish energy sector.  
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It is argued that the change in Poland’s energy mix has had a clear effect on 
energy policy, though it is the fact that dependence is increasing on Russia 
in particular that has been constructed as a threat in Poland. This 
dependence, particularly in the gas sector, has been used as a resource in the 
discursive construction of energy security in Poland. EU accession has also 
given the country the opportunity to develop credibility and present itself as 
an expert on the issue, one that is well placed to represent national but also 
regional and EU interests relating to both energy security and foreign 
policy. Despite lower overall dependence on Russian gas in the Polish 
energy mix, directly reliant on this source for only 10% of energy 
consumption, the pattern of strong reliance on Russia as a source of gas, and 
until recently little option to diversify supply sources, has been presented as 
a threat to Polish energy and also national, regional and EU security. 
Whilst dependence on imports does not necessarily constitute a policy 
problem, as is clear in the UK case, it has been framed as problematic and 
threatening in the case of Poland. Part of the explanation is related to 
historical relations with Russia and concerns regarding Ukraine dating back 
at least a decade, when Poland positioned itself as a leader on the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership strategy that included Ukraine. However, the 
‘securitisation’ of energy in Poland is not merely a discursive phenomenon. 
Whilst Poland has long been almost completely dependent on imports of gas 
from Russia this constituted a relatively small share of energy consumption 
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in the 1990s. Since the turn of the century there has been a significant 
material increase in Russian gas imports as domestic coal production 
decreases. Securitisation thus occurred, enabled by state-led mode of energy 
governance in Poland, where the Polish state has played a central role in 
directing and implementing energy policy to achieve energy and political 
objectives.  
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that going beyond the Copenhagen School 
conceptualisation of securitisation has considerable potential for examining 
the construction of energy security issues and the potential for further 
energy policy integration in the EU. Combining elements of both the 
philosophical and sociological wings of securitisation studies we have 
sought to address two research questions. First, has gas been constructed as 
a security issue and, if so, what form do those constructions take? Second, 
have technical and economic factors played a role in shaping these attempts 
to construct gas as a security issue?  
We have demonstrated that for the governments of both countries, energy 
security has become a policy priority and gas supplies have been 
constructed in terms of security. However, understandings of the extent, 
sources and form of insecurity have differed substantially. In the case of 
Poland, these constructions have most closely followed a classic 
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Copenhagen School logic of securitisation. Successive governments have 
repeatedly linked gas supplies with national security, making claims about 
the existential threat posed by its main supplier, Russia, potentially using 
energy as ‘a weapon’ to exploit Polish dependence on gas imports. In the 
case of the UK, by contrast, a logic of riskification is more evident. 
Government claims have centred on the UK’s potential vulnerability to risks 
emerging from its greater exposure to the European and international gas 
markets.  
Contextual conditions have played an important role in this process in both 
cases. The UK and Poland have significantly different state-market relations 
which has shaped the form that constructions of gas as a security issue have 
taken, leading to riskification in the former and securitisation in the latter. 
Prior to 2006, the UK adopted a completely market-led approach to the 
governance of gas, enabled by its ‘energy independence’. Investment 
decisions taken by the private sector in anticipation of the UK becoming 
import dependent altered the dynamics of the market, resulting in the 
government identifying risks that resulted in it developing a limited role in 
providing strategic direction to market participants to build the resilience of 
the market. This involved a greater level of governmental influence rather 
than a radical reassertion of state control.  
In Poland the government asserted its role in ensuring the security of gas 
supplies through control of the monopoly gas transmissions systems 
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operator, and the dominant gas importer and seller. This was justified on the 
grounds of a shift from ‘energy independence’ to an increasing dependence 
on gas imports from a single supplier: Russia. The government has played a 
leading role in attempting to diversify supplies and both developing and 
strengthening interconnections with neighbouring gas markets.  
These twin findings have broader implications for debates about the 
potential for the development of a common EU energy policy. The 
Commission’s efforts to develop a market-led system of energy governance 
across the Member States could, if successful, permit a degree of consensus 
around the form of security construction. However, if we accept that gas 
supplies have been constructed as security issues in different forms in the 
UK and Poland, that these states are exemplars of different modes of energy 
governance among the EU Member States, and that such modes of energy 
governance are to an extent predisposed to different forms of security 
construction,157 then there are significant challenges to reconciling these 
different forms of security construction and energy governance.  
This poses major challenges for further integration because even if there is 
intersubjective agreement within the EU that gas supplies are a security 
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issue, if the Member States cannot agree on what kind of security issue gas 
supplies represent then the development of a common approach for dealing 
with these threats and/or risks would appear unlikely. For proponents of 
further integration this is concerning, since claims about gas insecurity have 
long been central to the Commission’s attempts to develop a common EU 
energy policy. While the Commission has continued to argue in response to 
the crisis in Ukraine that, “more coordination of national energy policies is 
necessary to respond credibly to the challenge of energy security”,158 there 
are clear limits to the ability of ‘security’ to mobilise support in favour of 
further integration.  
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